FMCSA Cleans House: 3,000 CDL Schools Removed from the Training Provider Registry

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) took long-overdue action this week to clean up the nation’s CDL training landscape. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy announced that nearly 3,000 training providers have been removed from the federal Training Provider Registry (TPR), and another 4,500 have been placed on notice for noncompliance.

That’s 7,500 providers—roughly 17% of the registry—flagged in one sweep. The scale of the problem raises the obvious question: If these providers didn’t meet federal standards, how did they get on the list in the first place? The answer points directly to a core flaw in the way Entry-Level Driver Training (ELDT) was implemented. But is ELDT alone to blame, or does it go even deeper? That’s what we’re exploring in this article.

The Honor System

The TPR’s vetting process is shockingly simple. A school fills out FMCSA’s online form, self-certifies that it meets state requirements, and is automatically added to the federal registry. There’s no inspection, no credential verification, no site visit—not even confirmation that a school truly exists at the address it provides.

That’s it.

This is how the federal government has been regulating the entire CDL training ecosystem since ELDT went into effect in February 2022. It’s roughly akin to the self-certification process in place for electronic logging devices (ELDs), which is also now under increased scrutiny. Before Monday’s purge, the registry listed roughly 40,000 training providers, some private and others open for public enrollments. After removing thousands, tens of thousands will still remain, none of whom were vetted before being listed on the TPR.

The United States is running one of the most critical safety systems in commercial transportation—CDL training—on the honor system. And in an industry where DOT’s Office of Inspector General has documented persistent training fraud for decades, that approach makes little sense.

What ELDT Could Have Been

The original vision for federal CDL training reform was far more robust than what ultimately became law. Early drafts included:

• mandatory minimum training hours

• federal validation of schools before listing

• uniform instructor qualifications

• standardized behind-the-wheel competencies

But industry lobbying dramatically narrowed the program before implementation. By 2022, most of those provisions were gone. ELDT became a curriculum-based model: as long as a school teaches the required topics, it qualifies—regardless of whether that training lasts 40 hours or 400.

No minimum hours.

No pre-approval.

No federal instructor standards.

No performance benchmarking.

The result is a regulatory framework that defines what providers must teach, but not how thoroughly they must teach it—or whether they’re teaching it at all.

Rampant Fraud

Fraud Didn’t Stop in 2022. It simply adapted. The CDL fraud schemes FMCSA and state agencies have uncovered in recent years look strikingly similar to those that plagued licensing systems in the 1990s and 2000s.

Historical examples include:

• Operation Safe Road (Illinois/Florida), which uncovered more than 1,000 fraudulent CDLs and sent Illinois’s former governor to prison.

• Larex, Inc. in Florida, which used hidden earpieces and sham testing to secure hundreds of illegitimate CDLs.

• TTT Truck Driver’s School in Georgia, where at least 623 students passed falsified skills tests; when retested, 77% failed.

And more recent examples are just as troubling:

• Massachusetts CDL testing scandal (2019–2025): A State Police sergeant arranged passing scores for applicants described as “horrible” and “brain dead,” accepting kickbacks ranging from cash to home repairs.

• Louisiana DMV bribery scheme (2020–2024): Multiple state employees and third-party testers were indicted for selling passing scores and fraudulent credentials—two full years after ELDT took effect.

These schemes flourished because the system assumes compliance rather than verifying it. ELDT didn’t close the gaps. In many ways, it widened them.

The Cost in Lives

CDL fraud isn’t a paperwork issue—it is a highway safety issue with a tragic record.

• Six children were killed in the 1994 Willis family crash after a truck driven by a fraudulent-license holder lost a tail-light assembly on the highway.

• A massive 74-vehicle pileup in California left two dead and 51 injured; the driver’s fraudulent CDL was linked to a bribery ring.

• Seven Alabama prison guards were killed in a collision involving a driver operating in violation of an Imminent Hazard Order.

These aren’t isolated incidents. They are examples where investigators could draw a straight line between training or licensing fraud and fatal crashes. The real toll is undoubtedly higher.

 

What FMCSA’s Announcement Fixes—and What It Doesn’t

FMCSA’s sweeping removal of thousands of training providers is the most aggressive enforcement action taken since ELDT’s launch. Administrator Derek Barrs and agency leadership deserve credit for finally auditing the registry and acting on widespread noncompliance.

But the move is reactive, not preventive.

The agency is acknowledging—after the fact—that thousands of listed schools never met requirements. The 36,000 remaining providers? They were approved the same way: self-certification with no verification.

With limited staffing and tens of thousands of providers, FMCSA cannot realistically audit the entire registry. Many noncompliant schools will remain until a problem is reported or discovered during an investigation.

In short: The system still operates exactly as it did yesterday.

What Still Doesn’t Exist

Despite Monday’s action, the ELDT framework still lacks several foundational components of a robust training oversight system:

• No minimum training hours—schools can offer extremely short programs and remain compliant.

• No federal validation before listing—FMCSA approves first and inspects rarely, if ever.

• No student outcome tracking—there’s no visibility into which schools produce competent drivers.

• No fraud-tracking database—bad actors can simply reopen under new names.

FMCSA solved these problems for drug- and alcohol-related violations with the Clearinghouse: a centralized, mandatory, national data system that follows drivers across state lines and prevents evasion.

The same model could be applied to training fraud tomorrow—if policymakers are willing.

The Carrier’s Role in Training

Motor carriers cannot assume that an ELDT certificate equals quality training. The TPR listing only means the provider filled out a form—not that FMCSA validated their credentials, facilities, or curriculum. Carriers, themselves, need to take the reins!

A meaningful carrier training program is more than a regulatory checkbox—it can be a profit center when done correctly. Carriers that invest in real, substantive training consistently see lower turnover, fewer crashes, less equipment damage, and far stronger long-term driver performance. That return comes from teaching new drivers not just how to pass a test, but how to live on the road, manage fatigue, navigate real conditions, and build the habits that separate safe, professional operators from those pushed through a short, low-quality program. No school can provide that. The reality is that CDL schools exist for one reason: to get people through the CDL exam. Everything that makes a driver truly safe is the motor carrier’s and driver’s responsibility.

Real training begins with how carriers use their trainers. Too many fleets treat the trainer truck as a team operation, allowing the trainer to sleep while the student drives. But trainees learn nothing from a sleeping mentor. A trainer truck must be a rolling classroom, where an experienced professional sits in the passenger seat, teaching, correcting, observing, and offering real-time feedback. Trainers are also the carrier’s most valuable quality-control asset. They know better than anyone which schools produce competent applicants and which ones send out poorly prepared drivers. Their firsthand experience should feed directly into a carrier’s vetting decisions. If a trainer consistently reports that students from a particular school struggle with basic skills, that should influence whether the carrier continues hiring from that source. Trainers also need authority. If they don’t believe a student is ready to go solo, they should have the ability to say so—and their judgment must be respected. If a carrier doesn’t trust a trainer to make those decisions, that person shouldn’t be a trainer.

A strong training program also requires structure and documentation. Carriers should maintain weekly progress reports, performance reviews, and active management oversight. If a trainee struggles with shifting, spatial awareness, winter operations, or defensive driving, the system should catch that early. Documenting that progress not only improves training outcomes; it also protects the carrier in litigation by demonstrating diligence, monitoring, and corrective action. And the content of the training must reflect the carrier’s actual operation. If a fleet runs all 48 states, the trainee should experience real mountain driving, adverse weather, and region-specific hazards—not just flatland miles. A trainee who never practices on grades, runaway ramps, engine braking, or winter terrain is not prepared for nationwide operation, no matter what ELDT says.

Most importantly, carriers should not wait for FMCSA to require good training. Nothing prevents a carrier from setting its own standards, such as requiring 10,000 supervised miles before a student is eligible to run solo. Doing the right thing doesn’t require a federal rule. If carriers want safer drivers and stronger performance, they can choose to implement those standards today. These ideas—trainer involvement, documented progress, realistic exposure, mileage requirements, and trainer-driven graduation decisions—are not radical. They are a basic starting point. Because as long as many CDL schools continue to push out inadequately prepared students, and as long as some carriers continue hiring them without meaningful training, the industry will keep seeing the same predictable safety and performance failures. And as long as ELDT allows the theory portion of training to be completed entirely online, fraud will remain part of the landscape. The only meaningful safeguard in that environment is the motor carrier’s commitment to doing training the right way—not because the government demands it, but because the stakes on the road demand nothing less.

The Path Forward: What ELDT Needs to Become

FMCSA’s action this week is a positive step but not a fix. The system needs structural reform that aligns with the safety stakes. In our view, a modernized ELDT program should include:

• Mandatory minimum hours of behind-the-wheel and range instruction

• Federal pre-approval and periodic audits of all training providers

• A training fraud clearinghouse to prevent reentry by convicted offenders

• Publicly available outcome data linked to CDL holders and their training schools

The technology exists. The regulatory precedent exists. The need is overwhelming. What’s missing is the will to rebuild the system around verification rather than trust.

Conclusion

FMCSA’s removal of 3,000 schools sends a strong message: the agency is finally willing to enforce compliance within the TPR. But enforcement after the fact only highlights a deeper truth—a training system built on self-certification cannot deliver consistent safety outcomes. For 25 years, the CDL licensing and training landscape has been plagued by fraud, corruption, and inadequate oversight. Monday’s action is a start, but it is not reform. Reform begins when Congress and FMCSA acknowledge what the industry has long known: The honor system doesn’t work. It never has. And the stakes on America’s roads are far too high to keep pretending it will.